“Air suspension encounters difficulties in the United States” — The Autocar translation, 1958

In this document

This is the French translation of an article from the British magazine The Autocar, dated 20 June 1958, dedicated to the commercial difficulties encountered by air suspension on the American automotive market.

A commercial failure for 1958 models

The article recalls that these systems, offered as an option on 1958 American models, had raised high hopes: industrial circles — notably the “rubber companies” that had invested in new factories to produce the rubber membranes — were counting on “up to a million sales”, despite an extra cost of “$ 124 to $ 220” p. 36.

The reality is far below this: at the time of writing, only “6%” of General Motors cars and “less than 1%” of Ford cars are equipped with it, for an expected total not exceeding “100,000” units across all 1958 models p. 36.

The causes of the failure

The author puts forward several explanations: the context of “economic recession” which pushes towards more economical cars, a price deemed too high in view of an “almost imperceptible” improvement in ride, buyers' fear of potential maintenance complications, as well as “troubles caused by freezing” and “surfaces made damp in the valves in cold weather” p. 36.

1959-1960 Outlook

Despite this assessment, the article is reassuring about the future of the system: “improved systems” were to be offered on certain 1959 GM and Ford models, and Chrysler was seriously considering equipping its new 1960 chassis with air suspension p. 37.

Context

At the end of the 1950s, American manufacturers were experimenting widely with air suspension (using air membranes) as an alternative to conventional springs, while Citroën had made the choice, as early as 1955 with the DS, of a different technology: the hydropneumatic suspension developed by Paul Magès, combining air and oil. This translation of a foreign article is part of a broader technological watch then carried out by Citroën teams on competing solutions.

Archivist's perspective

This document is a piece of documentary monitoring rather than a technical text produced by Magès himself: it is a translation of a British press article, probably circulated internally to inform Citroën engineers about the American setbacks of a competing technology.

The handwritten annotations — mention of “Mr. Cadio” then a reference to “Mr. Magès” p. 36 — suggest the document circulated within the company, transmitted to Magès for information.

It is likely part of the same monitoring file on “air suspensions” as other preserved items, such as the handwritten cover page “Mr. Bongrand — Air suspension, 59-61” or the B.E.A. meeting sheet of 17 January 1961 comparing air and hydropneumatic suspension, which testify to a prolonged comparative monitoring of this competing technology by Citroën teams.