Paul Magès' notes of 30 January 1967: halting of project F and defects of the NSU engine

In this document

The halting of project "F"

A first note, dated 30 January 1967, announces the decision to "Stop F regarding the BEA ext." p. 93. Magès explains that one cannot manage investments on three fronts simultaneously: "a bodywork, a suspension, an engine" p. 93.

He specifies that the F vehicle equipped with a "600" engine would bring "practically nothing to the customer", due to a "greater gearbox resistance" — a passage underlined in blue in the text p. 93. According to him, the F "can only be potentially useful with the NSU", and not with a 4-cylinder engine deemed impossible to consider at the time; it is therefore necessary to wait for the green light for the NSU to relaunch the project p. 93.

A supplementary note mentions a budgetary point with a "Mr. Falcomat": expenses incurred 30, spent 25, of which 5 "strictly F veh.", 2 "perhaps recoverable", 8 "already reused" and 10 "to be reused" (equipment, building) without immediate use p. 94.

The defects of the NSU engine

A separate page, in blue ink, draws up a diagnosis of the NSU engine (Wankel-type rotary engine). Magès distinguishes "fundamental defects" — fuel and oil consumption, jerking/degraded acceleration, pollution — and "defects occurring during endurance": spark plugs, segments, "trochoid fissuring", wear, ignition stability p. 95.

He then details numerical data:

He also notes "hiccups" deemed "unacceptable" and the need to test several types of spark plugs p. 95.

Range programme tables

The following pages present product programme tables: evolution of the F/F2 towards a "New bodywork" and the NSU, a sequence towards a "4 cyl. (Fy)" and the 780 cm³ AM by 1970 p. 96; a "[Final] Situation 1973" mentioning the 2 CV, the AM, the AP and a "4 cyl." vehicle at 120 km/h, rate 1000 p. 97; finally a numerical production table 1966-1968 for 2 CV, AZL, AZAM, AY, AYB, AME and AMB p. 98.

Context

The "F" project refers, in the history of Citroën, to a compact vehicle programme intended to be positioned between the 2 CV and the Ami, relaunched several times and then abandoned between the 1960s and the early 1970s — it would never see the light of day under this name.

The NSU engine mentioned here corresponds to the Wankel rotary engine, whose use Citroën explored via the Comotor joint venture with the German manufacturer NSU; this engine notoriously suffered, at the time, from seal tightness problems and high oil and petrol consumption, difficulties that hindered its industrial development.

Archivist's perspective

This document is valuable because it shows Magès in a position of strategic arbitration, well beyond his preferred field, hydraulics: he explicitly conditions the future of project F on the fate of the NSU engine p. 93, which sheds light, it seems, on the internal hesitations that led to the final abandonment of the programme.

The highly technical diagnosis of the NSU engine p. 95 is part of the role of deputy head of Super-Control and technical writer that Magès held at the time at Citroën, having joined as a self-taught person in 1925 (autobiographical notes), echoing his better-known work on the AP suspension.

The range tables p. 96-98 are more akin to product planning notes than technical inventions; they nevertheless allow these reflections to be precisely situated in the tight 1966-1973 calendar mentioned by the Summary of folder 60-74.