Bercot-Brueder meeting of 8 October 1958: the DS hydraulic “catastrophe” incidents

In this document

“Catastrophe” incidents (p. 255)

The first notes list serious DS hydraulic incidents. Regarding leaks, Magès notes that “all tests” focused on O-rings, with a criticism of the fitters addressed to Dowty: the first delivery yielded “good, then bad” tests, hence a “return to O-rings” p. 255.

Regarding the pump, he states that if it “had been ordered as it had been initially designed”, the serious incidents “would not have existed” — pointing out the gap between design and actual manufacturing p. 255. Cylinder head sealing, the ball joint, sealing under the liner, and the suspension cylinder are also listed p. 255.

Operational incidents (p. 256-257)

The cut-out valve, initially drilled with a “6 hole”, was the subject of a modification requested on 28.10.57, prepared on 28.5.58 and re-requested on 30.9.58, with improvement observed by increasing the outlet section p. 256. A clutch release cylinder with a grid is mentioned as early as 9.10.56 p. 256. Better manufacturing (cylinder, rotary steering seal) reduces incidents p. 257.

Bercot-Brueder meeting of 8 October 1958 (p. 259)

Magès recounts having explained the essential points studied to “Mr. BB” on 8 October — pump, ball joint, pads. He insists: Studies and Lab tests “cannot highlight future incidents”, due to a lack of sufficient car quantities and conditions corresponding to those of the “All countries” customer. He pleads for the “most direct liaison possible” between the customer, BEA and the Lab p. 259. The examination of warranty returns, organized “with a delay”, revealed that “many parts” were changed “without valid reasons” p. 259. He mentions 1500 DS in “exceptional” countries (including Algeria, Tunisia) which “cannot function according to what we know” p. 259.

Repair method — the example of the pump (p. 260)

Before June, the pump returned to the workshop for “lack of flow”; on the bench, everything seemed normal (“RAS”), with an increase in returns towards July. Mr. Louis reports “lack of speed” among customers (Tour de France). The case of a car from Saigon is detailed: delivered in February 1957, the first echoes of malfunction appeared in July 1958 while it had only covered 8000/12000 km p. 260, 263. The question of the percentage of castor oil is also mentioned, with an “Hermet ban” p. 260.

Technical investigation and training (p. 261-262)

Magès judges the method “from a hydraulic point of view very clearly insufficient” p. 261. He criticizes the lack of continuity and estimates that he cannot count, in his team, on more than two or three people “capable of properly analyzing DS problems as a whole” p. 262. He cites the example of General De Gaulle's car: the feedback “Driver → Beneteau → Satin → Magès” leads to a simple “lack of second gear 3 or 4 times”, deemed unusable p. 261-262. He proposes training for technical investigators by the BEA, with a vehicle equipped under control, “following Duclos-Herment indication” p. 262.

Hot operation (p. 263)

The pump defect is highlighted “at 250 rpm”. Three waves of alerts are listed: internal cycling tests, ministry car, then cars from Saigon, Guadeloupe and Martinique p. 263.

Context

The DS, presented by Citroën in 1955, inaugurates the hydropneumatic suspension designed by Paul Magès. Pierre Bercot was then president of Citroën; the name “Brueder” (or “BB”) likely designates a technical executive of the time, not identifiable with certainty here.

The beginnings of the DS were marked, in the history of the brand, by difficulties in fine-tuning the hydraulics in real use, particularly in the hot climates of the colonies and overseas territories (Algeria, Tunisia, Antilles, Indochina), a context that sheds light on the mentions of Saigon, Guadeloupe and Martinique.

Archivist's perspective

This document offers a rare direct testimony of an engineer's self-criticism regarding the failures of his own invention in real use. It seems that Magès is preparing, or recounting, a report intended for his management, mixing technical diagnosis (pump, seals, cut-out valve) and organizational diagnosis — the lack of liaison between the field and the design office p. 259, 261.

The insistence on the training of “technical investigators” and on the rarity of minds capable of “analyzing DS problems as a whole” p. 262 reveals a concern probably recurrent for Magès: the difficulty of transmitting a fine understanding of hydraulics beyond his immediate circle.

This file finds its natural place in the “41.59” folder and its summary, dedicated to the developments of the hydropneumatic suspension and the DS.